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Abstract: 
Recent advancements in Artificial Intelligence namely in 
Deep Learning has heightened its adoption in many applications. 
Some are playing important roles to the extent that we are 
heavily dependent on them for our livelihood. However, as with 
all technologies, there are vulnerabilities that malicious actors 
could exploit. A form of exploitation is to turn these technologies, 
intended for good, to become dual-purposed instruments to 
support deviant acts like malicious software trojans. As part of 
proactive defense, researchers are proactively identifying such 
vulnerabilities so that protective measures could be developed 
subsequently. This research explores a novel blackbox 
trojanising approach using a simple network structure 
modification to any deep learning image classification model that 
would transform a benign model into a deviant one with a simple 
manipulation of the weights to induce specific types of errors. 
Propositions to protect the occurrence of such simple exploits are 
discussed in this research. This research highlights the 
importance of providing sufficient safeguards to these models so 
that the intended good of AI innovation and adoption may be 
protected. 
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1. Introduction 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is gaining in adoption in many 
scientific and technology domains. This is especially so with 
the advancements made by Deep Learning (DL) algorithms 
within the AI domain. The World Economic Forum 
recognizes AI as one of the key technology pillars driving the 
world towards the Fourth Industrial Revolution [22]. Such 
technology deployments now assume vital roles in keeping 
our lives and society safe and secure with deployments in 
health [23] and security [24]. 
Both Artificial Intelligence and Deep Learning have also 
been touted to be the game changer in the asymmetric cyber 
security landscape with the opportunity for cyber defenders to 
level up their capabilities to deal with the technological 
advancement of adversarial cyber attackers [4]. However as 
with all technologies, there will be associated forms of 
vulnerabilities to which adversarial actors may exploit to 
cripple, defunct and even turn these technology tools into 
adversarial ones for their own malicious use [2]. 
Artificial Intelligence has reportedly been used as 
offensive tools to identify vulnerabilities in systems and 
automate cyber attacks [5]. Brundage et. al further explores 
the possible use of AI and DL not only to be an offensive tool 
but as a trojaned tool disguised as a benign tool to an 
unassuming victim but transforms into the malicious Malware 
to launch its attack when triggered. The key question is how 
does one turn a benign model into a trojan.  
This preliminary research work studies a blackbox 
approach to trojanise a pre-trained model to induce malicious 
inferences with two simple steps. The first is a simple 
modification to the network structure to the target model. Our 
work demonstrates that this could be done without the need to 
alter the original model or have intrinsic knowledge of the 
model construct or network structure. The second step that 
relates to the trigger mechanism to turn a benign model to 
induce the intended model inference errors involves precise 
weights manipulation. This simple alteration of specific 
weight values, also known as binary level attack trigger [12], 
that takes O(1) time to execute.  
The next section of this paper provides background 
information about adversarial adoption of AI and DL. This is 
followed by related research work in the techniques used to 
trojanise deep learning models and protective techniques 
available to deal with such threats. The description of the new 
form of trojanising technique follows with a description of the 
validation tests and an analysis. The paper continues with a 
discussion of possible infection vectors and propositions for 
protective mechanisms to prevent this malicious exploit and 
concludes with a conclusion to this research work.     
2. Adversarial Artificial Intelligence 
Cyber security researchers have studied the use of 
Artificial Intelligence algorithms like Reinforcement 
Learning (RL) [1] and Generative Adversarial Networks 
(GAN) [2] to generate Malware that could evade detection 
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from anti-malware scanners. DeepPhish by Bahnsen et. al [4] 
demonstrated that their Long Short-Term Memory networks 
(LSTM) could effectively evade Phishing URL detectors. At 
BlackHat 2018, IBM presented their advanced malware based 
on Deep Learning algorithms called DeepLocker [3] that 
could evade detection from most anti-malware detectors and 
trigger the delivery of its malicious payload only when this AI 
malware recognizes the targeted victim using its facial 
recognition capabilities. As it is based on Deep Neural 
Networks, the standard malware forensics techniques of using 
reverse engineering to study the Malware to build counter-
measures is not possible due to the ‘blackbox’ characteristics 
of such networks. These research work and demonstrators 
reflect the enhanced adversarial capabilities with the use of 
Artificial Intelligence algorithms especially those with Deep 
Learning algorithms.  
3. Related Work 
3.1. Trojaned Deep Learning 
Another form of Adversarial Artificial Intelligence 
would be trojanised the AI models. There are a number of 
leading research work in studying how Deep Learning models 
could be trojaned. One popularly mentioned approach is to 
train models on the onset with corrupted or poisoned training 
datasets [9],[10],[11]. Chen et. al [6] demonstrated that a 
targeted backdoor could be created in Deep Learning systems 
using such data poisoning strategy by injecting poisonous 
samples into the training set to achieve adversarial objectives 
without any knowledge of the model construct and training 
dataset with the trigger key that would be unnoticeable by 
humans. Liao et. al [8] proposed another novel approach to 
data poisoning by designing different forms of stealthy 
perturbation masks applied to the training or update datasets 
as backdoor applied before model training or during model 
updates. Such techniques of trojanising the target model 
affects the induction bias of the model. 
Clements and Lao [3] proposed a technique of inserting 
malicious hardware trojan into the implementation of a neural 
network classifier to induce the desired perturbation or affect 
the activation output from custom hardware trigger and 
circuitry. This is a form of side-channel attack against the 
target model. 
Zou et. al [7] proposed their novel approach to insert 
modification to the targeted pre-trained model at the neuron 
level. Their approach also known as PoTrojan involved the 
additional extra neuron or neurons and their corresponding 
connection synapses and weights that would induce some 
variations to the error rates of the targeted model. However, 
their research proposition required significant modification 
and targeted training of the affected layers to achieve the 
intended malicious outcomes from the trojaned models. 
Another similar work is by Guo et. al [14] that proposed 
alterations to the original benign network and required 
training to embed the hidden trojan horse model. Such 
techniques involve the alteration of the target model. 
Finally, trojanised behaviours can be induced by altering 
the weights of the target models. This is also known as binary 
level attack [12]. Rakin et. al [13] proposed this form of neural 
networks based trojan attack by performing a bit-flip attack 
on certain vulnerable bits of the targeted Deep Neural 
Networks using a gradient ranking approach that induces all 
inputs towards one class. Our approach involves the 
combination of two approaches. The first is the model 
alteration while maintaining the integrity of the original 
network regardless whether the trojaned model is in either a 
benign or malicious mode. This alteration is only applied after 
the target model has completed its training phase. The second 
involves the trigger mechanism uses the binary level approach 
to switch between modes. Unlikely many of research 
discoveries, our research work demonstrates that a model can 
be trojaned without the need to disrupt inductive bias of the 
model through its ingested data but through the disruption of 
the model bias while preserving the structural integrity and 
inference accuracy of the original target model when it is 
either benign and malicious modes.  
3.2. Protection against Trojan Deep Learning 
Most research work done are focused on detecting and 
defending trojaned model induced by poisoned training or 
inference datasets. Gao et. al’s [17] proposed the use of 
entropy measurement of entropy in the model’s prediction 
against the provided inputs. Baluta et. al [15] developed a 
prototype tool called NPAQ that checks whether a set of 
neural networks (N) upholds a property (P). If a trojaned 
model exists, the measurement from NPAQ can be used to 
verify that the Trojan has been removed after the model is 
retrained on benign datasets. He et. al [16] uses the approach 
of measuring the sensitivity of the model when using a small 
set of ‘sensitive-samples’. Liu et al. [20] suggested that using 
trained anomaly detection classifiers could detect neural 
trojans however with a high false positive rate.  
These protective techniques are predominantly focused 
on detecting effects of poisoned data on the models under 
observation. While such techniques may be applied to our 
trojaned model when it is in malicious mode, false negative 
outcomes would be reported when it is applied to our model 
when it is in benign model.  
4. Trojanising Deep Learning Models 
In our research, we demonstrate how a model could be 
  
trojaned to produce malicious inference through two simple 
steps. The first involves extending the target model as part of 
the malicious payload design and the other involves binary 
manipulation of the weights in the extended part of model as 
part of the trigger mechanism. Our current research work was 
applied to target models based on popular Deep Learning 
models using Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) that 
performs feature extraction and capped by Fully Connected 
layers of standard Neural Networks (FCN) for the 
classification tasks. These are a number of these frequently 
used classification models with pre-trained weights readily 
available.  
4.1. Malicious Payload Design 
The malicious payload design involves the addition of 
one layer on top of the target model. This extension is placed 
on top of the target model’s output neurons. The input and 
output dimensions of this additional layer is the same as the 
dimensions of the output layer of the target model. Hence a 
pre-trained Imagenet model having 1000 outputs would have 
one additional layer of 1000 neural input and outputs which 
can be expressed as expressed in the following mathematical 
equations.  
 𝑦"# = 𝜎&(𝑥) (1) 
 𝑦*# = 𝜎*(𝑦"# ∗𝑊*)	 =	𝜎*(.𝑦/"# ∗	𝑤1*2134 )	 
 
(2) 
Hence the trojaned model takes the output 𝑦5  of the 
target model 𝜎& as the inputs to produce the trojaned output 𝑦*#. The matrix 𝑊* represents the weights of the additional 
layer without bias. Equation 2 details the mathematical 
expression for the additional layer. A linear function is used 
for 𝜎* hence when the appropriate matrix values are applied, 
the output of this layer has linear characteristics. The key 
design intent of our trojanisation approach to induce 
deterministic precise malicious outputs.  
4.2. Malicious Payload Development 
In this research demonstration, our trojaned model can 
operate in four modes. The first mode is benign mode that 
causes the trojaned model to behave normally. The prediction 
and accuracy outputs remain the same as the original target 
model would produce. In order to have this outcome, the 
additional layer uses an identity mapping 𝜎*(𝑦"#) = 	𝑦"# with 
the weights 𝑊* set to be the identity matrix. The output of 
the original model is carried through without change to the 
output of additional trojaned layer as illustrated in Figure 1(a). 
 
  
Figure 1. The left model (a) represents the Trojaned model in 
Benign Mode. The right model (b) represents the Trojaned 
model in Type I error. 
 
The second mode is to induce of type I error for the 
targeted class hence resulting in False Positive outputs. The 
trojaned model will intentionally infer a positive identification 
for a specific invalid input. This is done by altering the 
weights’ value to map the inputs (from the original model) to 
the intended outputs. Figure 1(b) illustrates the trojaned 
model’s inference behavioral output.  
The third mode is the induction of type II error that 
represents False Negatives as illustrated in Figure 2 (a). The 
trojaned model will classify the selected class as another class 
while validly inferring the other classes correctly. The final 
mode involves switching the classification of two selected 
classes Figure 2(b). Like first mode with type I error, both of 
these latter modes are configured through the manipulation of 
the identity matrix to map the outputs of the original model to 
the trojaned outputs. 
As the payload design requires specific values of the 
matrix 𝑊*	 to be altered hence the change of modes may be 
done very quickly in O(1) time with no additional preparation, 
like retraining, is required. Additionally, the trigger to switch 
between modes could be done with a small payload of a few 
bytes dependent on the byte size of specific weight values.  
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Figure 2. The left model (a) represents the Trojaned model in 
Type II error Mode. The right model (b) represents the Trojaned 
model in Switched Classification error. 
4.3. Delivery of Trigger Mechanism 
As mentioned earlier, the simple change of the weights 
of additional layer induces the change of state or mode of the 
trojaned model. This simple change of a few bytes has many 
possible delivery mechanisms options. The trigger could be 
delivered while the model is running as suggested by Rakin et 
al [13]. Alternatively, the change could be applied to a 
persistent form of the weights in the file system. In this 
research work, the focus is on the payload design hence a 
simple trigger mechanism of direct codification of the 
assigned weight values was used as part of the validation step.  
5. Methodology and Analysis 
5.1. Validation Test 
In our research demonstration, we used three popular 
classification models with readily available trained weights on 
ImageNet dataset from open source repositories. They are 
VGG16, VGG19, InceptionV3 [18][19]. Our validation test 
involves the task of classifying ImageNet images. In order to 
demonstrate the research objective that the selected target 
Deep Learning Image Classification models can be trojaned, 
we define three steps that we would apply to the selected 
targeted models.  
The first step is the preparation step that involves 
modifying the target models. This started with the 
instantiation of the target model and its ImageNet pre-trained 
weights from the Internet. We froze the weights of the target 
model hence rendering the model non-alterable throughout 
the validation test. We then applied the additional layer with 
unfrozen weights to the top layer of the target model. The 
weights of 𝑊* is initialized to the identity matrix. This sets 
the trojaned model to be benign mode.  
The next step is to set the weights of the malicious 
additional layer to induce the desired behavior for the test 
namely benign, Type I error, Type II error, Switched 
Classification Error as described in the previous section. For 
the benign mode, there is no further step is needed as the 
trojaned model is initially configured with its identity matrix 
to behave per normal. For the other modes, the primary class 
is first selected 𝑥6. This primary class represents the affected 
inferred class from the classification inference. Another class, 
that represents the secondary class 𝑥7, is selected to assume 
the supporting role to the primary class. This secondary class 
facilitates the generation of type I error by having the trojaned 
model inferring the secondary class as the primary class. The 
choice of the secondary class is also needed for Switched 
Classification error mode so that the inferred identity of the 
primary class is swapped with the secondary class. For Type 
II error mode to induce False Negative inference will only 
require the primary class. The expected output from the 
trojaned models will be validated using the following 
formulations where i = 1 and i = 2 represents the primary and 
secondary classes respectively. 
 𝑦*# =	 {𝜎&(𝑥1)	𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛	𝑖 ≠ 	1	&	𝑖 ≠ 	2 (3) 
 𝑦*# = A𝜎&(𝑥1)	𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛	𝑖 ≠ 	2	𝜎&(𝑥6)	𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛	𝑖 = 	2	 (4)  
 𝑦*# = A𝜎&(𝑥1B6)	𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛	𝑖 = 	1	𝜎&(𝑥7)	𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛	𝑖 = 	2	  (5)  
 𝑦*# = A𝜎&(𝑥7)	𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛	𝑖 = 	1	𝜎&(𝑥6)	𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛	𝑖 = 	2	 (6) 
 
The final step is to assess the classification outputs of the 
trojaned model in its various modes. We used the Tiny 
Imagenet [21] test dataset to assess the trojaned models. In our 
test, we selected three different pairs of primary and 
secondary classes and evaluated these models based on the 
number of True Positives, True Negatives, False Positives and 
False Negatives to facilitate consistent reporting of 
experimental results. Additionally, we evaluated the effects of 
the trojaned models with their other inference performance for 
non-affected classes to assess the premise that such 
trojanisation techniques has little effects of the rest of the 
trojaned models’ inference performance.  
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As this evaluation is to compare the inference effects of 
the trojaned model over the original model, hence the 
evaluation is done with the ground truth taken from the output 
of the original model 𝑦5 and compared with the output from 
the trojaned model 𝑦*#. 
5.2. Results and Analysis 
The following were the observations gathered from the 
test. The accuracy measurements based on the equations [3] 
to [6]. 
 
 
Table 1 – Trojaned VGG16 Model 
 
 
Table 2 – Trojaned VGG19 Model 
 
 
Table 3 – Trojaned InceptionV3 Model 
 
  The results observed was as expected with the trojaned 
models generating the corresponding errors. With the non-
selected classes, the inference accuracies were maintained 
with good accuracy outcomes while the affected classes were 
wrongly induced as expected. The accuracies for both selected 
and other classes in Mode 3 fluctuated slightly. This may be 
due to the effects of altered model biases when two classes are 
involved. 
6. Infection and Protection 
6.1. Infection & Trigger Vectors 
One possible infection vector to trojanise the targeted 
Deep Learning model is during the development of the model. 
The trojanisation of the target model may also happened when 
the model is already deployed in production however such 
modification of the network structure and its persistent 
weights would draw more attention to the induced change if 
the model and its weights are monitored closely for tampering.  
The trigger vector to initiate the change of mode of the 
trojaned model from its current mode to another may be 
delivered in a number of ways given the small signature of 
change to be induced. Examples may include the use of 
customized Malware with precise weight alteration 
mechanism delivered to the model during execution or at rest 
with the persistent form of the weights or hyperparameters 
that exist in the form of files or database entries. 
6.2. Protection from Model Trojanisation 
This research demonstration highlights the need to 
protect targeted models from internal and external attacks. 
The first order of protection needed is to secure the integrity 
of the model structure from insidious modification. As 
described in the previous section about the infection and 
trigger vectors, protective safeguards over the integrity of 
model structure is needed at all time through its lifecycle that 
includes during development phase with its design, training 
and validation. The model will also need to protect from 
unauthorized modification during production phase with 
regular integrity checks on the model structure. 
Additionally, in the event that the targeted model is still 
already trojaned but to deal the risk of trigger delivery, close 
monitoring and continual integrity checks of the weights or 
hyperparameters will need to be applied.  
7. Conclusion  
In this preliminary research, we demonstrated how a pre-
trained target image classification model can be trojaned to 
induce specific errors using a simple modification to model. 
The trigger may be delivered through a lightweight model 
weights modification. Our approach induces the maliciously 
Test Case Mode Other Classes Targeted Classes
1 1 100.0% 100.0%
1 2 100.0% 100.0%
1 3 98.7% 92.5%
2 1 100.0% 100.0%
2 2 100.0% 100.0%
2 3 98.9% 91.9%
3 1 100.0% 100.0%
3 2 100.0% 100.0%
3 3 96.5% 93.1%
Test Case Mode Other Classes Targeted Classes
1 1 100.0% 100.0%
1 2 100.0% 100.0%
1 3 99.0% 93.6%
2 1 100.0% 100.0%
2 2 100.0% 100.0%
2 3 98.8% 94.8%
3 1 100.0% 100.0%
3 2 100.0% 100.0%
3 3 97.7% 93.5%
Test Case Mode Other Classes Targeted Classes
1 1 100.0% 100.0%
1 2 100.0% 100.0%
1 3 100.0% 98.8%
2 1 100.0% 100.0%
2 2 100.0% 100.0%
2 3 100.0% 100.0%
3 1 100.0% 100.0%
3 2 100.0% 100.0%
3 3 100.0% 100.0%
  
directed model biases at the binary level without the need to 
induce inductive bias from poisoned data. Additionally, unlike 
other forms of model trojanisation, our approach induces near 
deterministic malicious outcomes with its specific weight 
value manipulation. This research demonstration highlights 
the need to protect AI models and reap their beneficial gains. 
This could be done by applying tight change control 
protection to ensure that network structure of the model and 
its weights are protected at all stages of the lifetime of model’s 
existence from both insider and external threats. Regularly 
integrity checks are needed to protect the models from 
unauthorized tampering or alterations.   
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